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Upstream rmsDownstream rmsost ci(qi,w)Final onsumersdemand p(Q)
w
pFigure 1: The simple vertial industry struture onsidered in this paper1. IntrodutionIn this paper we onsider a simple vertial industry struture as shown in Figure 1. There isan upstream setor with rms produing an input for the downstream setor whih uses theinput to produe a nal good that is sold to onsumers. We assume that due to artelizationor the abuse of a dominant position, the upstream setor is able to raise the wholesale prieof the intermediate good. This will most likely have a negative eet on diret purhasers asthe elevated wholesale prie leads to a ost inrease for diret purhasers. However, the diretpurhasers might be able to pass on some or all of the harm they suer to nal onsumersby inreasing their prie. The question we want to answer is how the total harm due to theinreased upstream prie is distributed over downstream rms and nal onsumers.This analysis is motivated by reent, and perhaps more importantly, likely future develop-ments of the legal framework of antitrust poliy with respet to the issues of pass-on defene andthe legal standing of indiret purhasers or lass ations for onsumers. In the setup onsideredin this paper in whih an upstream rm illegally raised the wholesale prie, pass-on defenerefers to the possibility that the upstream rm (defendant) an have a downstream rm's (plain-ti) laim redued by the amount that the latter passed on to onsumers by means of a higheronsumer prie. Legal standing of indiret purhasers onerns the question whether or notindiret purhasers (in the ontext of our paper: onsumers) who do not diretly deal with thelaw infringer are allowed to bring an ation before a ourt. We will review the development ofthe relevant antitrust law and poliy in the US and in the EU in some detail in setion 2 below.What omes out of this review is that in both of these jurisditions, (some form of) pass-ondefene and legal standing of indiret purhasers is in plae or is very likely to be establishedin the near future. The establishment of these two piees of legislation an be predited to leadto an inrease of ourt ases in whih the orret distribution (or apportionment) of antitrustharm down the prodution or supply hain needs to be determined.However, so far there is a lak of a general framework that omprises the full range ofompetitive models (from perfet ompetition to monopoly) and inorporates several modes ofompetition (e.g. prie or quantity ompetition in a homogeneous or heterogeneous market)in whih this apportionment an be analyzed. With this paper we hope to ontribute towards
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lling this gap.1 In the following we outline the ontents of this paper.Surely, an antitrust damage ase would at some point start with the determination of thetotal harm.2 However, this is a task that we do not onern ourselves with in this paper. Thereason being that this has been done in various other papers.3 Hene, we assume that thetotal harm is given and exlusively onentrate on the distribution of harm in a simple vertialstruture as shown in Figure 1.4We do not model the upstream setor and simply assume that due to artelization or theabuse of a dominant position the wholesale prie, w, has been inated.5Taking the total harm as given, we determine the distribution of this total harm in propor-tion to atual losses suered in the downstream setor and, due to pass on, on the level of nalonsumers. For this purpose, we rst determine the hange of downstream industry prots andonsumer welfare in response to an inrease in w, and then onsider the share of the total atualharm (loss in downstream industry prots plus loss in onsumer welfare) borne by onsumers.We refer to this share as the onsumer harm share (CHS).In setion 3 we start our analysis with a general homogeneous good model without makingspei assumptions regarding demand, osts, or the mode of ompetition. We show that theCHS is dereasing in the downstream industry prie-ost margin (PCM) and the prie elastiityof demand and inreasing in the Herndahl-Hirshmann index (HHI) of downstream industryonentration and the downstream output elastiity with respet to the input prie. The CHSturns out to be independent of the number of downstream rms aeted. Clearly, if somedownstream rms soure from outside the upstream artel or if they are vertially integratedwith upstream rms (and therefore not aeted by the artel) this aets the total harm dueto the artel. Further, there is a distribution eet between downstream rms (where theunaeted rms gain and the others lose from the upstream artel). However, this does notaet the distribution of harm between downstream rms and onsumers.1We review the relevant previous literature on this issue below.2As in Basso and Ross (2007), we will distinguish between harm whih refers to losses in eonomi surplusof downstream produers and onsumers and damages whih refers to the legal term used to denote paymentsto be made by defendants. For instane, in the U.S. rms an sue for damages whih are three times the harminited.3Earlier studies determining the harm are Baker and Rubinfeld (1999), Basmann and Boisso (1999), Connor(2001), Connor (2007), Finkelstein and Levenbah (1983), Fisher (1980), Harrison (1980), Page (1996), Rubinfeld(1985), Rubinfeld and Steiner (1984), andWhite (2001). More reent ontributions are Brander and Ross (2006),Kosiki and Cahill (2006), Hellwig (2006), Verboven and Dijk (2007), and Basso and Ross (2007).4Higher in the prodution hain, there ould be more layers between upstream rms and nal onsumers.For instane, one an think of manufaturing rms, selling to wholesalers, wholesalers selling to retailers whothen sell to nal onsumers. To keep the exposition simple, we fous on the ase of upstream rms, downstreamrms and nal onsumers.5We will not expliitly deal with the relationship between the absolute illegal gain of the upstream setorand the absolute loss of diret and indiret purhasers. We just illustrate this issue with the following example.Assume nal onsumer demand is P = 1 − Q and assume that there are m (n) Cournot rms upstream(downstream). One an then show that the illegal gain of upstream rms from raising the wholesale prieabove the subgame perfet equilibrium level w∗ to (1+ δ)w∗ (where δ>0) is larger than the sum of downstreamindustry prots and onsumer surplus, as long as long as δ < 2m(2n + 3)/(n + 2). See also Shinkel, Tuinstraand Rüggeberg (2005) and Basso and Ross (2007) on this issue.3
In setion 3.1 we onsider an extension of the basi model to allow for dierentiated goods.It turns out that in this ase the CHS hardly hanges ompared to the basi model.We illustrate our results with various examples assuming spei forms of demand andprodution osts. These examples show that whenever it is possible and appropriate to makespei parametri assumptions regarding demand and osts, the expression for the CHS anbeome very simple. For instane, assuming linear demand for a homogeneous good and (asym-metri) onstant marginal prodution osts, the CHS only depends on the number of rms andthe onjetural variations parameter and is independent of demand parameters, marginal pro-dution osts, and the wholesale prie.Clearly, the usefulness of the framework put forward in this paper hinges on whether itan be applied in atual antitrust ases at reasonable osts. Hene, in setion 4 we suggestfeasible proedures to estimate the relevant terms in the CHS. Our suggestions here ome intwo parts. First, as suggested by e.g. Harrington (forthoming) artels have the tendeny tokeep the wholesale prie w fairly onstant over time. This might make it problemati to atuallyestimate the eet of an elevated wholesale prie w that enters the CHS via downstream rms'ost funtions. To irumvent this problem, we show in setion 4.1 that instead of using shiftsin w one an exploit (equivalent) shifts in demand to estimate the CHS. This an be doneby onsidering ertain perturbations of the demand urve (brought about by demand shifters).A nie impliation of this proedure is that it allows us to onstrut a supply urve for thease of imperfet ompetition that inludes perfet ompetition and monopoly as speial ases.With the help of the supply urve we an, in turn, illustrate that basi intuition from the taxinidene literature arries over to the distribution of harm in a vertially related industry. Tobe more preise, the inidene of a per-unit tax in e.g. a ompetitive market is determinedby the slopes of the demand and supply urve. We show that this insight arries over to theontext of our paper where the role of a tax is played by the wholesale prie w. Seond, insetion 4.3 we elaborate on how the various building bloks of the CHS (elastiities and marketindiators like PCM and HHI) an be estimated in pratie. For this purpose we disuss datarequirements and suggest expliit formulas and regression speiations that an be used toestimate the building bloks of the CHS. Moreover we disuss several potential problems of theestimation proess suh as endogeneity issues.Finally, setion 5 onludes. The appendix ontains the proofs of the results.Related literature: We are not the rst trying to answer the question how total harm isdistributed over a prodution or supply hain. First, our analysis is related to the inidene ofan exise tax. An overview of this literature is given in Fullerton and Metalf (2002). Seond,there is also an extensive literature on the pass-through rate of prie inreases in (vertial)industry strutures. See for instane Kosiki and Cahill (2006) and the referenes therein. Notethat instead of onentrating on pass through rates of pries, we determine the distribution ofharm with respet to lost prots or lost onsumer welfare. Third, there is a reent literature thatdeals with the orret determination of damages in a vertially related industry. The ommonstarting point of these papers is ritiism of the so-alled overharge as a measure of harm inprie-xing ases. The overharge is the dierene between the antiompetitively elevated prieand the prie under ompetitive irumstanes multiplied by the number of units purhased4
at the elevated prie. Hellwig (2006) determines the hange in prots of a downstream rmaeted by an illegally raised input prie. In partiular, he deomposes the overall hange ofprots into three dierent eets (a per-unit revenue eet, a business-loss eet, and a osteet). Verboven and Dijk (2007) suggest a general framework to determine disounts on theoverharge as a measure of harm to downstream rms in prie-xing ases. As in Hellwig (2006),Verboven and Dijk (2007) also show that the overall hange in downstream rms' prots anbe deomposed into three eets (diret ost eet, pass-on eet, and output eet). Bassoand Ross (2007) determine the total harm to downstream rms and nal onsumers when theprie of a downstream input is raised upstream. They also provide measures of the distributionof harm between diret and indiret purhasers. However, in their analysis they rely on speiparametrizations of demand and osts. Finally, Han, Shinkel and Tuinstra (2008) onsider avertial industry struture with an arbitrary number of layers and assess the auray of theuse of the overharge as a orret measure of antitrust damages. Moreover, they assess damagesof suppliers of a artel in ase the latter is in operation further down the supply or produtionhain.Our paper diers in at least two main respets from these papers. First, we do not makeassumptions on the mode of ompetition between downstream rms. Firms may for exampleompete in pries, quantities or prie ost margins. Seond, unlike the papers disussed abovewe devote onsiderable spae to the pratial issues onerning the atual estimation of ourmeasure of the distribution of harm.2. Pass-on defene and indiret-purhaser standing in the US and in the EUIn this setion we review the evolution of antitrust law regarding pass-on defene and legalstanding of indiret purhasers both in the US and the EU. Note that below we do not arguein favor or against a legal system that allows pass-on defene or legal standing of indiretonsumers. We just wish to establish that in the urrent (and in likely future legal systems)there is room for pass-on defene and legal standing of indiret purhasers suh that an analysisas the one we arry out in this paper might be useful and welome.Regarding the development in the U.S., the starting point is the 1968 Supreme Court de-ision in Hanover Shoe, In. v United Shoe Mahinery Corp.6 in whih it was ruled that thedefendant ould not use a pass on defene to avoid liability. Roughly, the reasoning behindthis ruling was that the task of showing the extent of pass on would normally prove insur-mountable. An additional reason was that indiret purhasers might be too dispersed andtheir laims likely to be small suh that they would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit andlittle interest in attempting a lass ation. In this ase, those who violate the antitrust lawsby prie xing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality beause no one wasavailable who would bring suit against them.In 1977, in Illinois Brik Co. v Illinois7 the Supreme Court ruled that only diret but not6Hanover Shoe, In. v. United Shoe Mahinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).7Illinois Brik Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 at 730-31.5
indiret purhasers would be allowed to sue for antitrust harms. This an be viewed as a logialimpliation of the earlier ruling in the Hanover Shoe ase: if a pass on defene is not allowedthere is no room for indiret purhaser laims. In other words, if indiret purhasers were givenlegal standing, the extent of pass on would have to be determined whih would ontradit theearlier ruling in Hanover Shoe.With these two rulings in plae (no pass on defene and no standing for indiret purhasers)our analysis skethed above would hardly be neessary or relevant. But these two rulings on-stitute various problems. First, the Hanover Shoe ruling opened the doors for diret purhasersto laim the entire overharge that ourred even if they passed on some or all of this over-harge to their ustomers.8 This would imply unjustied windfall prots for diret purhasers.Seond, the Illinois Brik ase implies that there is no ompensation for other parties thatsuered damages (e.g. indiret purhasers or nal onsumers). Aordingly, the two rulingshave been ritiized from the beginning and in response things have hanged. In 1989 theSupreme Court ruled in California v ARC Ameria Corp9 that indiret purhasers may suefor trebled damages under state law although damages suered by diret purhasers may havebeen assessed by federal law. Kosiki and Cahill (2006) report that urrently 23 states and theDistrit of Columbia have so-alled Illinois Brik repealer statutes that give indiret purhasersstanding under state law. Finally, the Antitrust Modernization Committee (2007), heneforthAMC, rigorously assessing the U.S. antitrust law, gives the following advise to Congress:Diret and indiret purhaser litigation would be more eient and more fair if it took plaein one federal ourt for all purposes, inluding trial, and did not result in dupliativereoveries, denial of reoveries to persons who suered injury, and windfall reoveries topersons who did not suer injury. To failitate this, Congress should enat a ompre-hensive statute with the following elements: Overrule Illinois Brik and Hanover Shoeto the extent neessary to allow both diret and indiret purhasers to sue to reoverfor atual damages from violations of federal antitrust law. [...℄ Damages should be ap-portioned among all purhaser plaintisboth diret and indiretin full satisfation oftheir laims in aordane with the evidene as to the extent of the atual damages theysuered. (AMC, p.267).10All these developments and fats (together with onsumer lass ations whih are ommon inthe U.S.) suggest that eient methods are needed to determine how damages due to unlawfulprie inreases are distributed (or apportioned) over the prodution hain.With regard to the EU, it seems fair to say that the (ase) law is at a less advaned stateespeially with respet to the passing on defene in antitrust ases. The annex to the Com-mission's Green Paper on Damages ations for breah of the EC antitrust rules summarizesthe situation regarding the issue of a passing on defene as follows: It an be said that thereis no passing on defene in Community law; rather, there is an unjust enrihment defene [...℄(Commission (2005), Annex p.48), heneforth Annex. This assessment seems to have emerged8This is what is alled unjustied enrihment in European Court rulings. More on this below.9California v. ARC Ameria Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).10http://www.am.gov/report_reommendation/am_final_report.pdf6
from relatively reent ourt ases in whih rms laimed ompensation for illegal duties andlevies imposed by individual member states. Indeed, in Comateb11 the European Court of Jus-tie (ECJ) states: Aordingly, a Member State may resist repayment to the trader of a hargelevied in breah of Community law only where it is established that the harge has been bornein its entirety by someone other than the trader and that reimbursement of the latter wouldonstitute unjust enrihment. Furthermore, the ECJ's states in its ruling in Courage12: [T℄heCourt has held that Community law does not prevent national ourts from taking steps to en-sure that the protetion of the rights guaranteed by Community law does not entail the unjustenrihment of those who enjoy them [...℄ 13 This statement is onsidered by some observers asa positive stand towards a pass-on defene. Others ontradit this interpretation (see Norberg(2005), p.16).But also in the EU a pass-on defene is met with onsiderable septiism as the view thatneessary omputations are potentially very diult. In fat, the Commission states that Itdoes not appear possible to onstrut a model whih aurately identies, at reasonable ost,the harm suered by players at dierent levels of the supply hain. (Annex, p.46). Neverthe-less, the Commission also aknowledges that: The door to apportionment is opened by theCourt's reognition of partial passing on in Comateb and Mihailidis14. Surely, it is one of thepurposes of this paper to show that suh an analysis an be aomplished and to show how theapportionment works.With regard to the legal standing of indiret purhasers the situation in the EU seems to belearer. In the Courage ase, the ECJ states in 26: The full eetiveness of Artile 85 [now81℄ of the Treaty and, in partiular, the pratial eet of the prohibition laid down in Artile85(1) [now 81(1)℄ would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to laim damagesfor loss aused to him by a ontrat or by ondut liable to restrit or distort ompetition.(See also the Manfredi ase.15) This statement is interpreted by most observers to say thatboth diret and indiret purhasers an laim damages.In any ase, with the reent publiation of the White Paper on Damages ations for breahof the EC antitrust rules, the Commission emphasizes that damage ations are a high priorityin the EU. In fat, in its White Paper the Commission learly argues in favor of allowingpass-on defene and legal standing of indiret purhasers. With respet to the rst issue, theCommission states defendants should be entitled to invoke the passing-on defene against alaim for ompensation of the overharge. (White Paper, p.8) and with respet to the latterIn the ontext of legal standing to bring an ation, the Commission welomes the onrmationby the Court of Justie that any individual who has suered harm aused by an antitrustinfringement must be allowed to laim damages before national ourts. This priniple alsoapplies to indiret purhasers, i.e. purhasers who had no diret dealings with the infringer,but who nonetheless may have suered onsiderable harm beause an illegal overharge was11C-192/95 Comateb and others v Direteur général des douanes et droits indirets [1997℄ ECR I-165.12C-453/99 Courage Ltd v. Bernhard Crehan and Bernhard Crehan v. Courage Ltd., [2001℄ E.C.R. I-6297.13Note also that Waelbroek and Even-Shoshan (2004), p.6, state that passing on defene was onsideredpossible in Denmark, Germany (by some ourts) and Italy where the question had arisen.14C-442/98 Mihailidis [2000℄ ECR I-7145.15Joined Cases C-295-298/04, Manfredi, [2006℄ ECR I-6619.7
passed on to them along the distribution hain. (White Paper, p. 4, original emphasis).Furthermore, the White Paper also suggests poliy measures regarding olletive redress ofsattered and relatively low-value damage of individual onsumers and small businesses thatwould allow the aggregation of the individual laims of vitims of antitrust infringements.(for details see White Paper, p.4)Taken together, the development in Europe also hints at the importane of developing meth-ods to determine not only the exat amount of damage aused by antitrust law infringementbut also its distribution among diret and indiret purhasersa task that we set out to do inthis paper. 3. Basi modelConsider a simple vertial industry struture as shown in Figure 1. There is an upstreamsetor with rms produing an input for the downstream setor. Note that we do not modelthe upstream setor. We just assume that due to artelization or abuse of a dominant position,the upstream rms are able to raise the prie w of the input to w + dw. The downstreamrms have a ost funtion ci(qi, w) whih is stritly inreasing and onvex in qi and inreasingin w. That is, we assume that ∂ci(qi, w)/∂qi > 0, ∂2ci(qi, w)/∂q2i ≥ 0, and ∂ci(qi, w)/∂w ≥ 0.Furthermore, we assume ∂2ci(qi, w)/∂qi∂w ≥ 0 where the inequality is strit for at least onerm i (otherwise dw > 0 does not aet the industry in the short run)16. We allow dierentdownstream rms to have dierent ost funtions. Some rms may simply be more eientthan others or some rms may be more dependent on the upstream rms than others. Forexample, some rms may have a more exible tehnology that allows them to substitute awayfrom the upstream input if w is raised. Moreover, we expliitly allow some rms not to beaeted at all by the inrease in w, that is we allow ∂ci(qi, w)/∂w = 0 for some rms i. Theserms may soure their input outside the artel or they may be vertially integrated with anupstream rm and therefore not diretly aeted by the artel.To start, we assume that goods produed by the downstream rms are homogeneous. Henewe an write total output as Q = ∑ni=1 qi where qi is rm i's output level and n is the numberof rms produing in the market. Downstream rms fae an inverse demand funtion p(Q),where p is stritly dereasing in Q (p′(Q) < 0) and p′′(Q)Q+p′(Q) < 0 to ensure that the protmaximization problem of the rms is well dened.17Figure 2 illustrates our basi question for the ase of linear demand and osts equal to
c(q) = (c + w)q for eah downstream rm. Due to the inrease in the input prie from w0 to







Figure 2: Total harm for downstream rms and onsumers due to an inrease in w leading toa fall in total output from Q0 to Q1.harm for nal onsumers.To nd the eet of the wholesale prie w on onsumer surplus CS = ∫ Q
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(1)where we use the shorthand notation dQ/dw = ∑nj=1(dqj/dw). The sign of dCS/dw is deter-mined by the sign of dQ/dw whih we determine in Lemma 1 below.Turning to the downstream rms, we write the prot of rm i as
























+ p′(Q)θqi = 0. (3)Dierent modes of ompetition are nested in this framework. Firms may for example om-pete in prie ost margins, as suggested by Grant and Quiggin (1994). Well known ases inludeCournot ompetition with θ = 1, Bertrand or perfet ompetition with θ = 0 and the ollusiveoutome with θ = n. From now on we work diretly with equation (3) without mentioning theunderlying ations ai.We assume that 0 ≤ θqi ≤ Q for all i. The rst inequality implies that rm i does not expettotal output Q to fall in response to an inrease in i's ation dai > 0. The seond inequalityimplies that rm i does not produe less than a monopolist (who owns all the n rms) wouldlet rm i produe.19 Now we an prove the following result.Lemma 1 Assume that ∂2ci(qi,w)
∂w∂qi
> 0 for all i. Then an inrease in w leads to a fall in totaloutput Q. That is,
dQ
dw
< 0.The intuition for this result is simple: as rms' marginal ost urves shift upward (due toan inrease in w), rms redue their output to equate marginal osts and marginal revenuesagain. Note that Lemma 1 means that the eet of raising the wholesale prie on onsumersurplus, given in equation (1), is unambiguously negative. That is, Lemma 1 implies dCS
dw




(qi, w) + p
′(Q)θqi < p −
∂ci
∂qi
(qi, w) + p
′(Q)Q = 0where the right hand side of the inequality is a monopolist's rst order ondition for qi.20If, instead, ∂2ci(qi,w)
∂w∂qi





























. (4)Note that the seond equality follows from equation (3).The interpretation of this equation is as follows. If a rm perfetly antiipates the eet ofits output level qi on total output Q, the term in square brakets in equation (4) equals zero.The only eet left in this ase is that the inrease in the input prie dw > 0 diretly raisesosts and therefore redues prots (as −∂ci
∂w






































. (5)Note that equation (5) is written in terms of variables that are observable or an be esti-mated. That is, we have substituted away the parameters θ and ∂ci/∂w whih are not readilyobservable. We ome bak to estimating these items in setion 4.3.11
Equation (5) says that (eteris paribus) the onsumer harm share is smaller (i) the larger isthe industry aggregate prie ost margin PCM , (ii) the larger is the prie elastiity of demand







. (6)The rst term in the denominator is related to the pass through term and the seond term isthe ost eet for the downstream rms. The higher is the PCM, the more the inrease in wwill be absorbed by the rms and the lower the harm that will be passed on to onsumers. Orput dierently, the lower is PCM, the less the rms will absorb. The higher the prie elastiityof demand (for given PCM > 0), the harder it is for rms to raise their prie (in response to












(7)an be seen as a weighted average of |eqiw |
|eQw |
where the weights equal rm's squared market shares(sine H = ∑ni=1 ( qiQ)2). If big rms are relatively less responsive to a hange in w than smallrms, the expression in equation (7) is relatively small and onsumers tend to bear more of theharm due to dw > 0. The reason is as follows. As w inreases, rms' outputs are redued (seelemma 1). If this happens to a smaller extent for big rms than for small ones (beause the12


















































We see that d lnH
d lnw












= 1. If all rms reat to the same extent to













< 1 and H inreases in response to dw > 0 (beause eQw < 0). This inreasein market power leads to higher pries, thereby inreasing CHS.When faed with the task of determining the distribution of harm, the pratitioner an ingeneral proeed in two dierent ways. First, one an use equation (5) and diretly estimate allneessary terms given in this equation. This is what we illustrate in setion 4.3. Seond, onean make spei parametri assumptions on demand and osts and see whether this reduesthe number of terms that need to be estimated. The latter approah is what we illustrate next.Example 1 (Linear demand and osts) Let inverse demand be given by P (Q) = a − bQ andassume that osts are given by Ci(qi, w) = (ci+w)qi. In this ase CHS = nn+2θ . Note that CHSis independent of the size of the market (a), marginal prodution osts (ci), and the wholesaleprie (w). The only item to be estimated is the onjetural variation θ whih an be determinedusing equation (A.3) in the appendix. Note furthermore that CHS = 1 if either n → ∞ or
θ = 0 (Bertrand). In these ases all harm is ompletely passed on to onsumers. Further,
CHS = 1/3 when θ = 1 and n = 1 (Monopoly)21 or when θ = n (Collusion). In general, itholds that 1/3 ≤ CHS ≤ 1.Example 2 (Constant-elastiity demand and linear osts) Let inverse demand be given by
P (Q) = a(1/b)Q−(1/b) (Q(P ) = aP−b) and assume that symmetri osts are given by Ci(qi, w) =
(c + w)qi. In this ase we have CHS = bnbn−θ+bθ . Thus we get CHS = 1 if either n → ∞ or
θ = 0 (Bertrand). Further, CHS = b/(2b − 1) when θ = 1 and n = 1 (Monopoly) or when
θ = n (Collusion). Furthermore, we an have CHS > 1 if b < 1 and θ > 0. This result is dueto the fat that in this ase rms' prots inrease rather than derease with a rising wholesaleprie w over this range of the demand elastiity b. See e.g. Seade (1985).21This an be viewed as the harm ounterpart to the known result that the prie pass through rate (that is,the hange in the prie harged to onsumers relative to the hange in marginal osts stemming e.g. from theimposition of a unit tax) is exatly 50 perent if a monopolist faes linear demand and onstant marginal osts.See, e.g., Kosiki and Cahill (2006), p.612. 13
Note that in both of these examples CHS is independent of the wholesale prie w implyingthat for the determination of CHS the but for prie is not needed.In these two examples we assume that all rms are aeted. But atually this is notneessary for equation (5) to hold. Even if only a subset of rms is aeted by the inrease in
w, the distribution of harm is still given by (5). We illustrate this by onsidering the ase whereall rms fae the same ost funtion c(q, w). In partiular, out of the n rms, m ∈ {1, ..., n−1}fae a prie inrease dw > 0. Although, it follows diretly from proposition 1 that CHS is notaeted, we also provide a diret proof to illustrate this result.Corollary 1 In the ase where rms produe homogeneous goods and where n−m rms havea ost funtion c(q, w) while m rms have a ost funtion c(q, w + dw) it holds that
dCHS
dm
= 0.3.1. Dierentiated produtsInstead of assuming homogeneous goods as above, here we allow goods to be dierentiated.In partiular, we assume the utility funtion of a representative onsumer takes the form










. (8)We fous here on the symmetri ase where rms have the same ost funtions c(q, w),fae symmetri demand funtions and play a symmetri equilibrium.22 We dene the (market)22This symmetry assumption is neessary to get a straightforward denition of the market demand elastiity.We do not know how to meaningfully dene a market demand elastiity in ase rms harge dierent pries andprodue dierent output levels. Then a one perent inrease in eah rm's prie an lead to dierent perentagehanges in rms' output levels. Sine goods are dierentiated we annot simply add these output levels (addingapples and oranges). If in a partiular ase, the symmetry assumption is learly violated, equation (5) anbe applied by assuming that eah rm ats as a (loal) monopolist on the market of its own (dierentiated)produt. This is, of ourse, always possible but is more demanding on the time-series dimension of the data asrm spei variables annot be estimated on the ross setion of rms (unless one is willing to make additionalassumptions). 14
demand elastiity eqp as follows. Dierentiating the (inverse) demand funtion for rm i we anwrite:








d ln qj.We onsider a symmetri equilibrium where all pries pi inrease with the same perentage












. (9)Note that eqp is the elastiity of Chamberlin's DD urve that traes out the quantity demandedfrom rm i when all rms' pries hange.Consumer surplus is dened as



























< 0. (10)Prots of rm i are dened as














































































. (14)Analogously, to the ase of homogeneous produts, equation (14) says that (eteris paribus)the onsumer harm share is smaller (i) the larger is the industry aggregate prie ost margin
PCM , (ii) the larger is the prie elastiity of demand |eqp| (for given PCM), or (iii) the smalleris the wholesale prie elastiity of demand |eqw|.Note that the expression in equation (14) is the same as in equation (5) for the ase whererms are symmetri. The dierene is that rms produing dierentiated produts tend to faea demand funtion that is less elasti.Example 3 (Linear demand and osts) Let inverse demand be given by pi(q) = α − βqi −
γ
∑
j 6=i qj where β > γ > 0 and α > 0, and assume that osts are given by C(qi, w) = (c+w)qi.Straightforward omputations yield CHS = β+γ(n−1)
3β+γ(2θ+1)(n−1)
.24 Again, the CHS is independentof the size of the market (α), marginal prodution osts (c), and the wholesale prie (w). Theonly items to be estimated are the onjetural variation θ and the demand parameters β and γ.23Note that in ontrast to the ase of a homogeneous good treated in setion 3, θ here measures the eetof rm i's quantity on rm j's quantity (not on the total quantity Q whih is not dened with dierentiatedgoods).24For β = γ this expression is the same as in example 1. To verify this, note that θ with dierentiated goodsis dened as θd = ∂qj/∂qi for j 6= i, while for homogeneous goods we dene it as θh = ∂Q/∂qi. Hene for thesymmetri ase here, we have θd = (θh − 1)/(n − 1). 16








qβ−1i and assume that 0 < βγ < 1 (for strit onavity), γ < 1, and
β ≤ 1. If β > 1, β = 1, β < 1, goods are partial substitutes, homogeneous, omplements.Again, assume that osts are given by C(qi, w) = (c+ w)qi. In this ase we have
CHS = −
βn(1 − γ)
n− β2γ(γ + n+ θ − 1 + θ(γ(n− 1) − n)
.4. Empirially estimating the harmThe CHS expression onsists of two types of variables: elastiities and other variables. In thissetion we desribe how the values of these variables an be estimated. First, we disuss theelastiities. An important elastiity measures the eet of w on output of downstream rms.As argued below, if w is raised due to a artel, there is reason to believe that w will be relativelyonstant over time. This might make it hard to estimate its elastiity. Hene we rst desribehow demand shifts an be used as well to infer the elastiity. This leads to the onept of asupply urve in oligopoly. Then we proeed by desribing the data needed and the method toestimate the elastiities and other variables.4.1. What if w has hardly hanged over time?As suggested by studies on artels (e.g. Harrington (forthoming) and referenes therein), ifthe upstream rms form a artel, there may be a tendeny to keep w fairly onstant over time(even though the osts of produing the downstream input for the upstream rms does varyover time). This an make it problemati to identify the elastiities eqiw , eQw in equation (5).25If this is the ase, one an use another input for downstream rms and see how hanges in theprie of the alternative input aets qi and Q. If these inputs are used in xed proportions,then using this method is perfetly ne. If there is some room for substitution between theinputs, this method an be seen as an approximation.If suh an alternative input is not available, one an also use shifts in demand as a way toget information on the eets of ost shifts. This approah is illustrated here. An additionaladvantage of this approah is that using demand shoks allows us to derive a supply urve foroligopoly. Using this supply urve, we an generalize the following well known result in the taxinidene literature. The harm of a tax per unit of output introdued by the government isdistributed over produers and onsumers depending on the relative slope of the demand andsupply urves.Let us again onsider a market for a homogeneous good. We onsider the following pertur-bation of the inverse demand funtion
p(Q) + ε25Note that a low variane in w over time does not ompliate the estimation of the other fators in (5) suhas the inome share of the input. 17








dw.To ease notation, we fous here on the ase where ost funtions take the form ci(q, w) =
wq + ci(q). Then equivalent hanges satisfy dε = −dw. In this ase, we an use equation (5)with |eqiw | = eqiε , |eQw | = eQε . That is, we identify these elastiities using demand shifts instead ofhanges in osts.4.2. Tax inidene intuitionTo see the equivalene between our approah on the distribution of harm and the results inthe tax inidene literature, we dene a supply urve for oligopoly in the following way. With




































+ 1 + ψ
−p′
. (17)Under perfet ompetition, we have that PCM = 0 and thus CHS = − p′
ψ−p′
. Hene we repliatethe result that the inidene of harm due to dw > 0 is determined by the relative slopes of26Note the dierene between the supply urve dened in this way and a supply relation as dened in theliterature (e.g., in equation (4) in Bresnahan (1989)). In the literature a supply relation usually is the rst-orderondition of prot maximization as in equation (15) above. (The sum of the rst-order onditions for all rmsis referred to as industry supply.) However, we refer to a supply urve as the lous of equilibrium ombinationsfor p and Q in reation to the hange in a demand shifter.18
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p
p(Q) + ε supply urve with slope ψ





−p′′(Q)Qθ − p′(Q)(n + θ) + ∂
2c
∂q2








) (18)Hene higher n and lower θ (for given Q) lead to a atter supply urve. Thus, the more rmsthere are on the market and the more aggressive their ondut is (lower θ) the atter the supplyurve. In this ase, the rms do not absorb the inrease dw > 0 and hene onsumers bear abigger fration of the harm.27Compare this to the familiar formula ∆P/∆MC = eSp /(eSp − eDp ) of the hange of the onsumer prie (∆P )relative to the hange in marginal osts (∆MC) following the imposition of a unit tax in a ompetitive market.Here, eSp (eDp ) denotes the prie elastiity of supply (demand). See, e.g., Pindyk and Rubinfeld (2005), p.326.19
4.3. Speis on the empirial estimation of the distribution of harmFinally, we illustrate how the harm distribution an be estimated in pratie. We do this forthe homogeneous good ase. It is easy to adjust this for the heterogeneous good ase.In a typial abuse ase, one has available (or an relatively easily get) the following infor-mation for the rms in the relevant market: output per rm, the input prie ausing the harm,the amount of the input used per rm, other osts and ost shifters, prie of the downstreamrms' output and demand shifters. We need to have this information for a ouple of periods t(usually years). Let us onsider eah in turn.28It should be relatively easy to get the information on the downstream rms' output levels


















































.To determine the elastiities epw and eqiw we run the following regressions.30






αyk ln ykt + εt






αyki ln ykt + εitThe rst equation allows one to identify the prie elastiity as epw = αw0. The seondequation an be estimated for eah rm separately or as a panel if ertain elastiities are assumedto be the same aross rms. The relevant elastiity an then be identied as eqiw = βwi0.When estimating these equations, there an be an endogeneity problem with w0t on theright hand side. In partiular, if demand in the downstream market shifts out, pt tends toinrease and demand for the input goes up. If upstream rms fae inreasing marginal osts,
w0t will inrease as well. This leads to a biased estimate of αw0. Under either of the followingtwo onditions one does not need to worry about this endogeneity bias. First, if all relevantdemand shifts in the downstream market are piked up by the demand shifters ykt variables.Seond, if the downstream setor under onsideration is one of many setors buying the inputfrom the upstream setor and upstream rms are not able to prie disriminate between rmsfrom dierent setors. In this ase, it is unlikely that shifts in this downstream market aet
w0t. Hene, the variation in w0t is then aused by exogenous ost shifts for the upstream rms.If neither of these onditions holds, one needs to ollet data on upstream ost shifts. Theseare then used to instrument w0t. The instrumented wholesale prie is then used to estimate
αw0 and βwi0 in the equations above.If w0t does not vary enough over time, it beomes hard to estimate αw0 and βwi0. If thereis no or not enough variation in w0t, one an hoose another input j whih is used in a similarway as the input under onsideration and then one an approximate epw = αwj. If suh aninput is not available, one an use one of the demand shifters ykt, as desribed in the previoussub-setion to identify the elastiities.30Note the similarity with the Panzar-Rosse statisti (Panzar and Rosse (1987)) dened as the sum of fatorprie elastiities of rms' revenues or output levels. 21
5. Summary and onluding remarksOne of the reasons why the U.S. Surpreme Court ruled out a pass-on defene in the 1968landmark ase Hanover Shoe was that the task of showing the extent of pass on would nor-mally prove insurmountable. In fat, forty years after this ruling Bulst (2006, p. 738) statesthat: There seems to be no reported ourt deision, neither in the United States, the UnitedKingdom, Frane nor Germany, in whih a ourt alulated or estimated the amount of anoverharge passed on to an intermediate purhaser.In this paper we suggest a general framework that allows to determine how the total harmdue to e.g. prie-xing in an upstream market is distributed over rms in a downstream marketand nal onsumers. In this framework we make no spei assumptions regarding demand,osts, the mode of ompetition, or the kind of prodution tehnology that downstream rmsuse in order to turn inputs into nal onsumer goods. We show how the onsumer harm sharean be determined both when goods produed downstream are homogeneous or dierentiated.Furthermore, we develop a proedure that allows to estimate the relevant terms for the harmdistribution even if elevated upstream pries are rather onstant over time. Finally, we skethhow a pratitioner an atually estimate the relevant items in the expression of the onsumerharm share.The motivation for this exerise is two-fold. First, with the framework we put forward herewe hope to ontribute to showing that in priniple the task of apportioning antitrust harmin vertially related industries is not insurmountablean assessment that was perhaps nevershared by all eonomi observers. We see this as omplementary to reent eorts of reonsideringthe determination of the absolute amount of harm resulting from anti-ompetitive prie-xingases as put forward in e.g. Hellwig (2006), Verboven and Dijk (2007), and Basso and Ross(2007).Seond, not allowing a pass-on defene may reate unjustied windfall prots for diretpurhasers as they an laim the entire overharge even if they passed on some or all of thisoverharge to their ustomers. Van Dijk and Verboven (2005) hint at the possibility that thismay lead to distorted pries. Moreover, in the 1977 Illinois Brik ruling, indiret purhaserswere denied the right to sue for antitrust damages. This implies the problem that parties whowere harmed annot sue for ompensation. Due to these problems, the two ourt rulings ofHanover Shoe and Illinois Brik have attrated a lot of ritiism.31 In response, hanges inthe law have already been established (suh as the Illinois Brik repealers) while others arelikely to be implemented in the future (see e.g. the suggestions of the Antitrust ModernizationCommittee as ited in setion 2). This reates a sense of urgeny to develop methods for thepratial apportionment of harm over the various links in a prodution/supply hain. Withthis paper we hope to make a ontribution towards this goal.We end this paper with some remarks.31Of ourse there are several reasons in favor of ruling against a pass-on defene and against indiret purhasersto have standing as put forward by e.g. Landes and Posner (1979). Among those reasons are that diretpurhasers might have an informational advantage due to their loseness to the infringer, and that indiretpurhasers might have small and dispersed laims whih lessens their inentives to sue for damages.22
First, in the models above we only assumed that the upstream setor somehow managesto illegally inrease the wholesale prie w. Hene, our analysis does not only apply to plainprie-xing agreements, but to all kinds of antiompetitive strategi behavior that result inan elevated wholesale prie suh as (input) forelosure, predatory priing (after having beensuessful), limit priing or exlusive dealing.Seond, our results equally apply to the question of how ost savings upstream (due to,say, merger) are passed on to downstream rms and onsumers. For a related disussion seeTen Kate and Niels (2005).Third, in our analysis we did not onsider the possibility that the unlawful rise in theupstream prie may lead to adjustment by rms in the form of entry or exit. We leave thisas a topi for future researh. We note, however, that the pratitioner faed with the task ofestimating the onsumer harm share given in equations (5) and (14) ould use long-run insteadof short-run elastiities to take this into aount.Fourth, for simpliity our analysis above assumed an industry struture onsisting of onlythree layers. However, it is oneivable that the prodution or supply hain onsists of more thanthree layers.32 If this is the ase, the CHS developed in this paper an be applied several timesto determine the share of the total harm that is borne by eah layer of the industry. For example,let's assume that there are four layers: an upstream setor (U), two onseutive downstreamsetors (D1 and D2), and nal onsumers (C). Furthermore, assume that the upstream setorharges the illegally raised wholesale prie w to downstream setor D1, whih in turn inreasesthe prie p1 it harges to rms in the downstream setor D2, whih in turn inreases the nalonsumer prie p2. In this ase, one an use our framework omputing two onsumer harmshares. The rst (CHS1) only onsidering the hain U − D1 − D2 and substituting the nalonsumer demand we used in our analysis above with the demand funtion of downstreamsetor D2. The seond (CHS2) onsidering the hain D1 − D2 − C where D1 takes the roleof the upstream setor raising prie p1. Note that CHS1 an be used as a sreening deviefor how severe the pass-on from the upstream setor down the prodution hain really is. If
CHS1 is suiently small, then the entire ase an be dismissed and there would ne no needto determine CHS2. If CHS1 turns out to be suiently big, however, one an use the two
CHSs to determine the share of the total harm that is borne by eah layer in the hain.
32Note again, that Han, Shinkel and Tuinstra (2008) onsider a model with an arbitrary number of layers.23
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.The assumptions p′(Q) < 0, p′′(Q)Q+p′(Q) < 0 and 0 ≤ θqi ≤ Q imply that the term in squarebrakets is negative. Further, the assumption ∂2ci
∂q2i
≥ 0 implies that the seond term in braketsis negative as well. Next, ∂2ci
∂qi∂w























































































− 1. (A.4)Using Shepard's lemma ∂ci
∂w









































|eQp |.From this the equation in the proposition follows. Q.E.D.Proof of Corollary 1: Prots for aeted and unaeted rms are given by, resp.
πu = p(Q)qu − c(qu, w) (A.6)
πa = p(Q)qa − c(qa, w + dw). (A.7)The rst order ondition for a rm i = a, u an be written as
p(Q) − c′qi + p
′(Q)θqi = 0and total output is given by






+ (P (Q) − c′q)
dQ
dw















where SOC = 2p′(Q)θ − c′′qq + p′′(Q)θ2q < 0 stands for the seond order ondition. Multiplyequation (A.9) by n−m and equation (A.10) by m, then add the two equations to get
[−SOC − np′(Q) − p′′(Q)θQ]
dQ
dw
= −mc′′qwPut dierently, dQ
dw














dQ/dwwhih is independent of m beauseas found abovedQ/dw is linear in m. Hene, also CHS(the reiproal of d(CS+Π)/dw
dCS/dw





























































. (A.14)Substituting this expression for θ into (A.12) leads to
dΠ/dw
dCS/dw









+ 1 the equation in the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
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